INTRODUCTION
Every city, no matter how small, is in fact divided into two; one the city of the rich, the other the city of the poor [Plato, The Republic].
In most cities people with high-skill, high-wage jobs live in select areas or suburbs, and those with low-skill, low-wage jobs-or no job at all-reside in very different parts. Residential segregation is sustained primarily by differentials in the price of housing between the two types of communities.
This social polarization, which seems to have become more acute in recent years, is often deplored on grounds of creating inequity in educational opportunities (e.g., Reich [1991] ). But there is also an implicit issue of efficiency: socioeconomic segregation is said to deprive some communities of the chance to acquire even modest levels of skills, and thus to adversely impact the quality of the labor force. Moreover, it is argued, the "urban problem" has, or will eventually have, negative repercussions on the standard of living of the high-skill class itself-although through which channels is rarely articulated. This paper takes up these issues, by formalizing the links between residential choice, educational investment, and production in a city composed of several communities. We consider a model where identical agents choose whether to become high-skill workers, low-skill workers, or to remain outside the formal labor 622 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS "Human capital accumulation is a social activity, involving groups of people in a way that has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital." Lucas also identifies cities as important groups in this respect and suggests that land rents should reflect local externalities in human capital. Such is the case in our model, but rents are not sufficient to replace the missing markets. Because the imperfections that we consider do not reside in the financial system, they are also not amenable to simple measures such as government loans or transfers. Even educational subsidies might be poor substitutes for appropriate neighborhood composition. These points seem quite relevant to the debate on whether increased funding alone can improve the performance of the American education system, particularly in "disadvantaged" communities.
This paper also departs from the standard approach to nonconvexities in macroeconomic models, which focuses on a potential multiplicity of symmetric, Pareto-ranked equilibria. We explore instead the role of asymmetries, which lead to an endogenous partitioning of the set of agents, that has important aggregate implications. The emphasis on local interactions and stratification is shared with Montgomery [1990] , who studies contagion in "underclass" behavior, and with Durlauf [1992] , who shows how local externalities in education and income-based rules for community membership can create persistent pockets of poverty.
Section I presents and discusses the model. Section II examines the integrated city, a useful reference point. Sections III and IV show how segregation arises in a dual city, and how it affects human capital investment and efficiency. Section IV extends the argument to a large number of communities, and links the extent of segregation to that of productivity losses. Section V concludes. Proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
I. THE MODEL

A. People
There is a continuum of identical individuals, with measure N. Each of them is endowed with one unit of labor, which can be used to participate in the production of a single, numeraire good. Each agent has the choice between three occupations: (a) Remaining outside the (formal) labor force, e.g., being unemployed or engaging in home production. This yields a utility level v.
(b) Becoming a low-skill worker. This requires exerting an effort level CL, but allows him to earn the low-skill wage WL.
(c) Becoming a high-skill worker. This requires exerting effort CH > CL, but allows him to earn the high-skill wage WH > WL.
These alternatives will often be abbreviated as U, L, and H. High-skill workers can be thought of as managers and professionals; low-skill workers as employed in line production and clerical jobs. CL and CH would then represent the efforts required to complete high school, and to get into college, respectively. The determinants of WH, WL, CH, and CL are examined below. Utility is additively separable in income and effort:
(1) Ui = wi -Ci + mi -r where wi and Ci are the wage and effort level chosen by agent i, ri the rent that he pays, and iTi any additional income that he might receive, from land ownership or home production. For an unemployed worker, w i = Ci = 0, and i = v.
B. The City
These agents can either live in the city or remain outside in the countryside or in other cities. This outside option yields the same utility v as remaining in the informal urban sector; this is a convenient but unessential normalization. The city is divided in two, say, by a river. In each community (East and West, or Center and Suburb) are N12 housing units, each suitable for occupation by one individual or family.3 Each unit belongs to a different landowner, who will receive a competitively determined rent. Landowners can be viewed as a separate group of agents who consume but do not work, and have utility given by (1). Equivalently, the N workers could each own a plot and receive its rent.
Whereas education takes place at the community level, production is a citywide activity. This interaction of local and global complementarities will be at the heart of the novel effects identified in this paper.
3. The model can be extended to allow for an upward-sloping supply curve for land in each community, or variable housing density. These margins may reduce the extent of segregation and its impact on efficiency, but only at the price of distortions in land utilization.
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C. Production
All workers are employed in competitive firms that produce the numeraire good, with constant returns to scale. Sharing common labor and product markets is what makes communities part of the same metropolis, rather than mere disjointed cities. Technology is F(HL) = Of (H,L), with &2f1&H2 < 0, 2 f/aL2 < 0, 32f1&H&L > 0, and 0 a productivity parameter. The wages for highand low-skill workers, WH -F(H,L)I&H, WL -F(H,L)I&L and the wage differential Aw(H,L) (WH -wL)(H,L) depend only on the citywide factor ratio HIL. Since acquiring high skills always takes greater effort (see below), Aw(H,L) must be positive in any equilibrium. Therefore, HIL is always less than j, defined as the unique solution to WH(pl) = wL(p,l); p is the ratio that maximizes the city's gross output, and is independent of 0.
D. Education as a Local Public Good
The first key assumption of the model is the presence of local human capital spillovers, which make education a "club good": in each community, the more agents acquire a high level of human capital, the easier it is to pursue any kind of education.4 See Figure I . ASSUMPTION Al. The costs of education CH(x) and CL(X) decrease with the fraction x of individuals in the community who invest in high skills.
(a) Examples. There are many plausible channels through which such local complementarities may operate. Since workers with high skills earn higher wages, the most obvious one is a fiscal externality. If schools must. be financed from local resources, and if they provide a complementary input to individual effort, the return to studying will be higher in a richer community. The model's basic properties would thus remain unchanged if, instead of x, the argument of CH and CL was the community's per capita income.
There are also many channels that do not depend on imperfections in credit markets (and are therefore not amenable to simple policy measures such as government loans or income redistribution), but involve pure human capital externalities. The first one is peer effects in education. For instance, in a high school the more students who work hard with the aim of getting into college, the 4. As illustrated by the examples below, the relevant notion of "community" is the group or area within which this effect operates, and thus depends on the externality under consideration. We make the convenient assumption that each community extends over half the city; it will be relaxed in Section IV. The Costs of Skill Acquisition less time teachers need to devote to discipline, and more generally the more studious the atmosphere. This makes it easier for any college-bound student, but also for one who aims only to graduate, to achieve his goal. An analogous effect arises in Banerjee and Besley's [1990] model of testing: a higher proportion of hardworkers makes grades more informative of individual ability, and thereby increases everyone's incentive to work hard. Another example, now involving adults, is that of social networks: knowing an established worker-especially at the managerial level-whose recommendation could "get you in" decreases the cost of getting any type ofjob [Montgomery, 1991] . This person can also serve as a role model, demonstrating to the young the value of education [Streufert, 1991] . Finally, an alternative interpretation is that unemployed and low-skill workers, or some fraction of them, impose on their community negative externalities such as crime, drugs, and other disruptive influences.
( The second key feature of the model is that the spillover from high-skill workers affects the two types of investment asymmetrically. The following assumption accords well with most of the examples given earlier. This sorting condition, reflected by a steeper slope in Figure I , is what leads agents to segregate.6 Since those choosing high qualifications care more about the level of education around them, they will bid more for land in the more highly skilled community. We shall often refer to the slope differential -AC' as the "net" complementarity among high-skill workers. This is in contrast to the "gross" spillovers -C'H and -C'L that operate within the high-skill group, and from the high-to the low-skill group, 5. Borjas [1992] identifies a somewhat different effect: a male child's human capital is determined in part by the average level of human capital in his ethnic group. But, of course, ethnic groups often reside in distinct neighborhoods. Finally, one should note that it is still a debated issue whether all these studies truly capture group effects rather than some unobserved characteristic common to all member families; see Manski [1991] .
6. Henderson, Mieskowski, and Sauvageau [1978] find that high-and lowability grade school students benefit equally from peer group improvement. But all that is needed for segregation to occur is that CL -C'H be even slightly positive. Moreover, one can view A2 as representing the reduced form of other segregationinducing effects, such as a differential sensitivity of high-and low-skill investments to educational expenditures, as in De Bartolome [1990] .
respectively. Intuitively, stratification will arise in response to the net effect, no matter how small, whereas the city's surplus involves the gross effects, which can be quite large. When C'L = 0, this distinction disappears, and with it the potential for segregation to be inefficient.7 That is why it is important that agents choose among three occupations, H, L, and U, rather than just the first two.
We denote the total cost of educating a fraction x of a community's population to high skills, and the rest to low skills, as
Intuitively, one would expect ?F(x) to increase with x, at least past a certain level. But this will not be necessary for any of our results. For some of the externalities that Assumptions Al and A2 are meant to capture, particularly those related to education, the simultaneity of occupational choice, peer effects, and residential choice may seem unrealistic. It is mostly adults who determine the quality and resources of the communities in which children make their investments in education. Such intergenerational effects are nonetheless quite consistent with our model. As is intuitive, the equilibria of the simultaneous choice game studied here correspond to the steady states of an overlapping-generations model where adults choose location, recognizing that their children's education opportunities will be affected by community composition; see Benabou [1991] .
E. Equilibrium Conditions
An equilibrium consists of wages, community compositions, and land rents that clear the labor and land markets: firms maximize profits, and no agent wants to change occupations or communities, or to leave the city. Denote the proportions of high-skill, low-skill, and unemployed workers in communityj = 1,2 as (xj,yjl -x; -yj) and the rent as rp. The high-skill work force is thenH = N(x1 + x2)/2, and the low-skill workforceL = N(yi + Y2)/ 7. In Miyao [1978] segregation (a homogeneous city) results from each group's either disliking the other ("negative intergroup externalities") or liking its own ("positive intragroup externalities"). Here, everyone likes high-skill workers, but others with high skills like them most; also, the distribution of types is endogenous. The welfare implications will be completely different. The first condition requires all occupations chosen in community j to yield the same, maximal level of utility. The second one states that rj is the maximum of the rents or surpluses which workers in each of the three occupations are willing to bid for living in communityj. Equivalently, these are the rents that make them indifferent between living in community j and living outside the city, and hence also indifferent between communities. Note that if community j is not fully employed, or equivalently, is partially empty (x; + yj < 1), it generates no surplus: rj = 0.
II. THE INTEGRATED CITY
We first study a city with a single community or sharing group. This is a natural starting point, where agents cannot isolate themselves from others. It also corresponds to the (unstable) symmetric equilibrium of a subdivided city. Using this benchmark to analyze the (stable) asymmetric equilibrium will bring to light most clearly the effects of mobility and stratification.
A. Equilibrium and Simple Dynamics
Assume that all agents are employed as either high-or low-skill workers, in proportions x and 1 -x. Since all face the same costs and rewards, they must all be indifferent between the two occupations:
Aw(x,1 -x) = AC(S).
Multiple equilibria are not the focus of our interest. To ensure that (3) has a unique solution, we assume that the complementarity between H and L workers in production, which makes Aw(x,1 -x) decrease in x, dominates the (net) complementarity among H workers in education, which makes -AC(x) increase in x.8 Such is It remains to verify that agents find work preferable to unemployment, as has been assumed. In other words, an individual's decision to become educated and participate in production must generate a positive surplus:
This net product increases with the level of productivity 0, both directly and through x. We assume that 0 is high enough for (5) to hold. Finally, the land market clears when workers are indifferent between living in or out of the city. This occurs when landowners appropriate all the surplus from production, leaving workers with their reservation utility. PROPOSITION 1. There is a unique symmetric, or integrated, full employment equilibrium. A fraction x of agents acquire a high level of skills, where Aw(j,1 -x) = AC(x). The land rent is P.
At the other extreme from this full employment equilibrium, there may exist a trivial equilibrium where no one works, or equivalently where the city fails to materialize. In this case there also exists an unstable equilibrium with partial unemployment in-between." Both these equilibria generate zero surplus or rents; they represent coordination failures in an integrated city, and have nothing to do with location. We shall essentially ignore them.
B. Efficiency
The integrated city equilibrium suffers from the standard underinvestment problem, as individuals acquiring high skills are not rewarded for lowering the education costs of others. Indeed, denoting aggregate surplus by V(x) F(x,1 -x) -4>(x), we have
This inefficiency in the work force's composition does not describe anything new; nor is it related to location. The more interesting issue is whether it is improved or worsened by selfsegregation.
10. Note also that if all interactions were local, i.e., if the two communities had separate labor markets (as in Berglas [1976] ), they would operate as two different cities; the unique equilibrium would then be point S.
11. See the Appendix, following the proof of Proposition 1.
III. THE SEGREGATED CITY, WITH FULL EMPLOYMENT
We now turn to the dual city. Our main purpose is less to explain stratification (which may arise from a variety of sources) than it is to elucidate how it shapes human capital decisions and the city's net product.
We focus in this section on the case where all agents choose to work. We first explain how those with high and low skills selfsegregate, and how this in turn affects the occupational mix. We then show that stratification may be inefficient, even though each high-skill worker benefits more than his low-skill counterpart from living in a better educated community.
A. Simple Dynamics
Let us abstract for now from the land market as well as the possibility of unemployment, and consider again a simple process by which agents in each community respond to the incentive to switch from low to high skills: The term -1 reflects the complementarity between H and L workers, or substitutability among H workers, in citywide production. When AC is constant, we are in the standard neoclassical case, and any (xl,x2) such that Aw(xl + x2,2 -xl -x2) = AC is a stable equilibrium. Normalizing AC to its value AC(x) under integration, the dynamics are identical to those of Figure Ha The symmetric equilibrium S is now occupationally stable but locationally unstable, in the following sense. The stable path, converging to S, lies along the first diagonal; thus, citywide, symmetric perturbations to the skill mix do not persist. Conversely, the unstable path lies along the direction (1,-1) , which corresponds to H and L individuals trading places, with total numbers unchanged.12 Identifying allocations that are mirror images of one another, we shall always take community 1 to be better educated: x, ? x2.
B. Stratification, Land Rents, and the Skill Mix
We now examine how segregation is sustained in the land market, and how it affects the distribution of skills acquired by the labor force. The equilibrium corresponding to the symmetric allocation S is illustrated in the left panel of Figure IV . Since communities are identical, so are rents, and there is no reason to move. But as soon as x, becomes slightly larger than x2, the West side becomes more attractive to all agents; its rent increases, with the land going to the highest bidders. Those are clearly the individuals investing in high skills, since they value living in community 1 more than the others: CH(X2) -CH(X1) > CL(X2) -CL(x1). So additional high-skill workers move West, making that area even more attractive and driving Ar _ r, -r2 up farther; low-skill workers migrate in the opposite direction.
This stratification continues until one of the two communities becomes homogeneous: in Figure III the unstable path intersects either the x2 = 0 or the x, = 1 boundary, depending on whether x is above or below 1/2. In the first case, all high-skill workers are able to regroup on the West side. In the second, some of them have to live on the East side, with the low-skill workers. But neither situation is yet an equilibrium, because segregation has altered the incentives for occupational choice. When x < 1/2, the concentration of human capital into community 1 lowers the net cost AC(x,), allowing yet more agents to pursue high qualifications. In equilibrium, there are x1 > 2a such workers; see panel a of Figures III and IV . Finally, the rent differential r1 -r2 ensures that low-skill workers in both communities are equally well off. 
Rents are rj = WH(H,L) -CH(xl) -v > 0 and r2 = WL(HL) -CL(X2) -v > 0. The rent differential r1 -r2 equals CL(O) -CL(i1) in the first case, CH(I2) -CH(1) in the second, and lies strictly in-between in the third.
These results are proved in the Appendix. In particular, (10) precludes any stable equilibrium with unemployment, except for the "empty city" equilibrium where no one works. The first two cases correspond to the two panels of Figure IV . The last one is also intuitive: acquiring high skills is very easy when almost everyone else is doing it, but very difficult when no one else is doing it.
D. Efficiency
We now examine the efficiency properties of the market outcome. We start with a simple example and then examine the general principles at work. Figure I . In economic terms, this represents decreasing social returns to the concentration of high skills, which agents fail to internalize as they segregate in response to the differential (CH -C'L)(X) in private returns.
Consider a Leontief technology, requiring both types of labor in unit proportions. The only issue is the cost of training this labor force. In an integrated city it is CH(1/2) + CL(l/2) (times N/2); with H and L workers segregated, it becomes CH(1) + CL(O). This arrangement is less efficient if CL(O) -CL(1/2) > CH(1/2) -CH(l), which means that CL(x) is steeper at lower values of x than CH(x) at high values; see
We now turn to the general analysis. An allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it maximizes the utility of the representative agent, i.e., the per capita surplus of output over education or training costs: (11) 2V(x1,y1,x2,y2) -F(x1 + x2,y1 + The intuition for the (nontrivial) proof is that a less than fully employed community does not produce any surplus; moreover, if 0 is high enough, the surplus from the N/2 agents living in the other community can be shown to be less than Nf, which can be generated by a fully employed city. The planner's problem now simplifies to choosing the skill mix of each community, and her objective function becomes ( 
12) 2V(xlx2) F(xl + x2, 2 -xl -x2) -(D(x1) -(D(X2).
The problem is separable into finding the geographical allocation that minimizes the cost of achieving any given proportion HIL = x/(1 -x), and then finding the value of this ratio that maximizes surplus: max {F(x,1 -x) -min{f((x1) + (F(x2) lxi + x2 = 2x}}.
Whether it is optimal to group high-skill workers together or to spread them evenly depends on whether education costs 'D(x) are concave or convex. This in turn reflects a tradeoff between two effects. On the one hand, there is the asymmetry that makes high-skill workers care more about community composition. On High-skill workers are evenly spread to minimize total costs, and their total number chosen so that the net social value of training an additional one is zero. We can now summarize how self-segregation affects welfare.
(a) Its impact on the underinvestment problem is beneficial in communities where high-skill workers concentrate, but adverse in those that they desert. In our simple model only one of these margins is operative at a time, depending on x t 1/2.
(b) It lowers the total cost of education in the high-skill community, but raises it in the low-skill community. When F is convex, total costs rise, creating another inefficiency on top of the underinvestment problem. When F is concave, total costs fall, improving welfare.
When CF is convex but x < 1/2, these two effects go in opposite directions. The segregated equilibrium of Figure IIIa is dominated by a symmetric allocation, x1 = x2= i1/2, but it could still be more efficient than the symmetric equilibrium: j1 + P2 > 2PA. This implies that imposing integration (say, of adults) without at the same time subsidizing high skills (for children) may reduce total surplus.
IV. THE SEGREGATED CITY: GHETTO AND SELF-DEFEATING SECESSION
We now turn to a case where stratification has even more drastic consequences. Instead of merely affecting the skill mix and education cost of the labor force, it causes part of the city to drop out of the productive sector. Moreover, the attempt by the highskill group to secede is self-defeating, in a sense specified below.
We again start from the symmetric equilibrium assuming for now that x < 1/2; see Figure V . As the high-skill workers of community 2 (say, the Center) move to community 1 (say, the Suburb), it becomes more difficult for those left behind to maintain even low skills. In the previous section, (10) ensured that this Recall that -is an upper bound on the factor ratio HIL in any equilibrium, so that wL(pl) = WH(pl) is an upper bound on the low-skill wage. This condition therefore means that in a community totally deprived of high-skill workers, the return to low-skill education is negative. As a result, the exodus of the high-skill group leads agents in community 2 to remain unskilled and to drop out of the labor force. The city center becomes an unproductive "ghetto." But this is not the end of the story. Since the number of lowskill workers has declined, their wages rise. This reduces the incentive for individuals in community 1 to become highly skilled workers; hence less of them do so, until the labor market clears. As the labor market is now reduced to community 1, constant returns to scale imply that in equilibrium the factor ratio must be the same as in an integrated city: HIL = x/(1 -x); see Figure V . The end result of stratification is a halving of production and surplus. The first result stands in sharp contrast to Proposition 2(a). Where the concentration of high-skill workers led to a desirable increase in HIL, with H + L unchanged, it now leads to a reduction in both H and L, with HIL unchanged.
The intuition is simple. Each high-skill worker who moves away from community 2 contributes to driving up the cost, hence reducing the supply, of a complementary input: low-skill labor. This in turn reduces the demand for high-skill workers. This "self-defeating flight" arises from the two key features that distinguish our model from previous ones: the interplay of local and global complementarities, and the endogenous distribution of types. We shall come back to it in the next section.
The second case in Proposition 5 is also quite intuitive.
Consider the allocation described in Figure 
V. THE EXTENT OF MIXING AND THE EXTENT OF PRODUCTION
The preceding sections compared the equilibria of an integrated and of a dual city. The assumption of two communities was convenient but somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, whether or not the 13. As usual, between this equilibrium and that with x2 = Y2 = 0, there is then an unstable one where community 2 is partially employed. whole high-skill labor force of the integrated equilibrium could regroup into a single community (x ; 1/2) played an important role in shaping the segregated equilibrium.
To show that the basic insights are quite robust, we derive in this section a related result that holds for any number of communities and is invariant to the value of x. But its primary interest is to make strikingly clear that the degree to which a city "works," in both senses of the term, may be inversely related to the feasibility of segregation.
Let the city be divided into m communities or neighborhoods, of equal size N/m. The parameter m measures how effectively groups of agents can segregate themselves from others. It may reflect technological constraints such as a minimum efficient community size resulting from fixed costs, or institutional ones such as school districting or zoning laws.
We start on Figure The "productivity meltdown" identified in the preceding section thus becomes worse, the easier it is for those seeking to become high-skill workers to isolate themselves from their low skill-counterparts. Their individual incentives to secede are selfdefeating, preventing most of them in equilibrium from achieving the occupation they seek. In the limit where perfect segregation is feasible, its pursuit leads to a total collapse of the productive sector. As usual, this is a steady-state outcome, which may be reached only over the course of several generations.14 This striking result has a simple intuition. When everyone can "walk away" from helping to train low-skill workers, no one will provide that public good. Production would then have to be carried out with high-skill workers only. But this cannot be an equilibrium, even when it is technologically feasible: any agent in a high-skill community would want to switch to low skills, which command a higher wage and have a lower cost CL(1) < CH(1). And if some did switch, their high-skill neighbors would secede, driving up the cost of low skills, and so on.
The results of Proposition 5 show most clearly the destructive potential of residential self-segregation in the presence of externalities in human capital investment. They formalize Bradbury, 644 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Downs, and Small's [1980] discussion of how city-suburban mobility may generate self-aggravating forces leading to very inferior outcomes. One particularly interesting interpretation, which seems consistent with the fate of industrial American cities, is that of a failure to modernize: the city is unable to adapt to new, superior technologies that require greater or more up-to-date skills from production workers. Similarly, in a less developed country a modern industrial sector fails to develop and replace agriculture and other traditional activities.
These results are also quite robust. They do not require that the planner want complete integration, or even full employment. The planner can always generate the per capita surplus P > 0 corresponding to the integrated city, whereas the laissez-faire surplus becomes arbitrarily small. Acquiring low skills without any high-skill workers need not be impossible, just costly enough. Last but not least, the results do not require either type of labor to be essential to production, but only that the elasticity of substitution o* be finite. If aI/(1 -at) > 1, maximal employment is higher, and more skewed toward high-skill workers, the higher is a. But if a/(1 -a) < 1, greater substitutability actually contributes to shrinking production.
In practice, cities contain more than one occupationally mixed community. What matters then is the relative measure of mixed to fully homogeneous areas; this is really how 1/m should be interpreted. Note that individual agents seeking to achieve the best education at minimal cost will always try to achieve maximal segregation, i.e., to increase m.
V. EXTENSIONS AND RELATED ISSUES
This paper has shown how the tendency for different social classes to segregate in response to local externalities or public goods influences the way in which a city works, or fails to work. We explained how stratification affects the costs of educating the labor force and the mix of skills that it acquires. We also showed how it can create ghettos, and even bring about a complete collapse of the city's productive capacity. The model is simple enough, and the basic ideas sufficiently general, to allow for many extensions.
One can think of a country as, essentially, a collection of cities plus an agricultural sector. Since the stable city equilibrium is unique and gives labor its reservation utility, the national outcome simply replicates it, with any local variations in technology or urban structure reflected in land rents. The model then shows that countries with identical endowments but different degrees of social stratification can have very unequal levels of productivity. The natural next step is to endogenize the technologies and institutions that constrain individuals' ability to isolate themselves from others.
Another country-level application of the model becomes readily apparent if the East and West sides of the city are relabeled as East and West Germany: the whole analysis can be directly transposed to the effects of migration on both regional disparities and national income.
Whatever the relevant notion of community, collective action will often interact with the individual mobility and education decisions on which we have focused. For instance, landowners or developers should compete for high-skill agents, who bring with them higher land values. Decentralized taxes and subsidies may nonetheless fail to restore the social optimum, especially if it is asymmetric: there may be no pure strategy equilibrium, because by offering a little more to the highly skilled, a community can attract a large number of them. Moreover, it neglects any impact this might have on the rest of the labor force. These issues will be explored in future work. More generally, extending the model in the direction of the local public goods and political economy literature should prove fruitful.
We have abstracted from several other features of the real world. One is heterogeneity in abilities, tastes, and endowments. As mentioned earlier, this omission is intentional, to show that one need not appeal to significant innate differences between people to explain how neighborhood effects shape the labor force, or even the existence of unemployed ghettos. Nor are imperfections in financial markets necessary: ours is a representative agent model, where initial resources play no role. The other omission is dynamics, as we have focused on long-run outcomes: the equilibria of our static game correspond to the steady states of an overlapping-generations model, where community spillovers operate from adults to the young.
In reality, initial conditions and transition paths do matter, as shocks to a family's human or financial wealth seem to have long-lasting effects. In particular, if residential choice is hampered by inherited characteristics such as race [Loury, 1977] or wealth constraints [Durlauf, 1992] , the long-run distribution of skills and income may be path-dependent. Moreover, the idea that the manner in which agents coalesce at the local level has a powerful influence on human capital accumulation and aggregate productivity is clearly relevant to growth, where dynamics are of the essence. We pursue this link in Benabou [1992] , and show that stratification often has opposite effects on growth in the short and in the long run. This presents society with an interesting intertemporal trade-off.
APPENDIX Technical Conditions
Throughout the paper we maintain two assumptions that ensure that both kinds of labor are supplied, and that a city where agents cannot segregate has a unique full-employment equilibrium. Both hold if 0 is high enough.
